Can We Cooperate with Russia?
By JOSEPH KIM ‘26
It is no secret that Russia and the United States have been rivals for decades. However, upon the growing threat of hostile Chinese economic and military actions around the world, some Americans, including many prominent politicians, have begun to advocate for conciliatory relations with the Russian Federation in order to focus on our greatest rival, China. Former presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy said in his speech at the Nixon Presidential Library in August that “the Russia-China alliance represents the single greatest military threat that we face in the U.S. today.” He suggested giving Russia portions of Ukraine and resuming economic trade with Russia in return for removing nuclear weapons from Kaliningrad and ceasing their partnership with China. In a rally in South Carolina in February, Donald Trump declared that NATO members who do not meet the quota of 2 percent of GDP on their military would not be protected by the United States and that he would even encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want.” In other words, a Russian invasion may become the punishment for failure to contribute fairly to the alliance’s collective security. In light of these statements from prominent politicians, an obvious question comes to mind: Would cooperation with Russia advance American interests? In what situation could the United States reasonably take a hand off of Russia and build friendly relations?
In the next several years, I believe that the United States should only cooperate with Russia under conditions that significantly reduce the Russian threat to international stability. This goal can only be achieved if the Russian government agrees to certain criteria that put them in a less threatening position. The most threatening Russian actions are those of foreign military occupation. First and foremost, Russia must agree to fully withdraw from occupied territories in Ukraine and Georgia as a baseline for discussions of friendly bilateral relations with the United States. Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, support for separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk, and the flagrant full-scale invasion of Ukraine are more than enough to scar American-Russian relations. Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia also threatens the sovereignty of a potential NATO and future EU member state, thus further alienating Russia from the United States. However, a withdrawal from Ukraine and Georgia is a mere starting point in amicable diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States. Cooperation can only begin if both parties no longer conceive of each other as a national threat.
Russia’s military buildup in Eastern Europe and a potentially dangerous arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons (Russia possesses more nuclear weapons than even the United States) naturally cause distrust from neighboring European countries. If Russia desires to rebuild European and American trust, the Russian leadership must agree to reduce military presence in outreaching stretches of its sphere of influence. Perhaps the most threatening piece of Russian territory is Kaliningrad Oblast, a slice of Baltic land between Lithuania and Poland. The Russian Army, Navy, and Air Force have developed a strong presence in this exclave. There are many more Russian troops guarding the borders of Kaliningrad with Lithuania and Poland than there are NATO forces along the same borders. Ramaswamy’s call for the removal of nuclear weapons from Kaliningrad previously mentioned is meaningless. In the regrettable scenario of a global nuclear war, Russian nuclear capabilities reach over 10,000 miles, meaning that Russia can already target any location in the Northern Hemisphere, regardless of Kaliningrad. Rather, the demilitarization of conventional forces in Kaliningrad would make a great difference in alleviating European fear and distrust of Russia. Demanding general demilitarization of Russian land, naval, and air forces in Kaliningrad Oblast would bring Eastern Europe a step closer to peace, as Russian forces would no longer threaten the land connection between Poland and the Baltic republics or threaten the security of the Baltic Sea.
Another consistent trouble for American allies in Eastern Europe is the Lukashenko dictatorship in Belarus. In addition to numerous scandals, false elections, and international incidents, the Belarussian government has ailed Poland by intentionally creating a migrant crisis on their shared border and has served as a staging ground for the initial Russian attempt to capture Kyiv. In order to secure European security and the freedom of the Belarussian people, Russia, as Belarus’ primary partner, must agree to restore Belarus to popular order—or more realistically, to a somewhat democratic government. Although direct Russian cooperation against Lukashenko would not be necessary, Russia should at the very least not militarily inhibit NATO efforts to return free elections to Belarus.
In all, Russia must remove its military forces from Ukraine, Georgia, and Kaliningrad, and allow democratization of neighboring Belarus. Only with these minimal concessions can the United States and its allies develop enough trust in Russia to enter an alliance with it. In return, Russia could resume normal trade with the United States and its allies. These are not extreme demands. These bare necessities do not aim to make Russia vulnerable; the purpose of these demands is to secure the safety of NATO republics, which would immediately improve relations between Russia and the Western world.
However, Putin and the Russian government are no fools; they will not freely hand over influence to the United States and its NATO allies. Agreeing to any one of these peaceful demands loses Russian leverage on the United States and NATO, which Putin desperately needs. Putin prioritizes power over the West over partnership with the West. The only way the current Russian government would agree to enter cooperative, cordial relations with the United States and its European allies is if Russia turns all ex-Soviet republics into buffer states by establishing diplomatic and military dominance over the region. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “Putin, for years, sought to divide the West from the rest, claiming that Russia was advancing the best interests of the developing world.” The United States must not be fooled by this old Russian lie. Although collaboration with Russia would theoretically allow a concentration of American efforts against China, the risks of a stab-in-the-back from an untrustworthy ally are too significant to undertake. Because of the unfortunate reality of the differences in national interests of NATO and the Russian Federation, the two powers cannot be allies in the current world.
As President Biden declared on NATO’s 75th anniversary, “Now, like generations before us, we must choose to protect this progress and build on it. We must remember that the sacred commitment we make to our Allies—to defend every inch of NATO territory—makes us safer too, and gives the United States a bulwark of security unrivaled by any other nation in the world.” Americans must understand that any alliance with the United States is a privilege. Rather than the United States appeasing and giving in to demands, Russia must take the initiative to establish friendly relations with the United States by offering reasonable concessions in good faith.